A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (repost)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation By Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole
Publisher: The M I T Press 1993 | 731 Pages | ISBN: 0262121743 | CHM | 4 MB
Publisher: The M I T Press 1993 | 731 Pages | ISBN: 0262121743 | CHM | 4 MB
More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.