Lacanian Ink 27 - The Names-of-the-Father

When, in his "Rapport de Rome", Lacan refers to Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing,” one should read closely his indications of how he conceives this identification of the analyst with the Hegelian master, and not succumb to the temptation of quickly retranslating the “Absolute Knowing” into the accomplished symbolization. For Lacan, the analyst stands for the Hegelian master, embodiment of “Absolute Knowing,” insofar as he renounces all enforcing (forçage) of reality and, fully aware that the actual is in already itself rational, adopt the stance of a passive observer who does not intervene directly into the content, but merely manipulates the scene so that the content destroys itself, confronted with its own inconsistencies—this is how one should read Lacan’s precise indication that Hegel’s work is “precisely what we need to confer a meaning on so-called analytic neutrality other than that the analyst is simply in a stupor” — it is this neutrality which keeps the analyst “on the path of non action.” The Hegelian wager is that the best way to destroy the enemy is to give him the free field to deploy his potentials, and that his success will be his failure, since the lack of external obstacles will confront him with the absolutely inherent obstacle of the inconsistency of his own position. Slavoj Zizek, "Lacan as Reader of Hegel." What, in Lacan’s eyes, is the true nature of how philosophy operates? What does Lacan identify as “philosophical,” in order for his anti-philosophy to assume its full meaning? Philosophy operates, in Lacan’s eyes, by affirming that there is such a thing as a meaning or sense of truth (sens de la vérité). But why would philosophy maintain this? Because its objective, the consolation it offers us, and which goes by the name “wisdom,” is to be able to assert that there is a truth of the Real. Alain Badiou, "The Formulas od L'Étourdit."