Value Solutions in Cooperative Games (repost)
Value Solutions in Cooperative Games by Roger A McCain
English | 2013 | ISBN: 9814417394 | 236 pages | PDF | 1,6 MB
English | 2013 | ISBN: 9814417394 | 236 pages | PDF | 1,6 MB
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition.
Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the field of game theory.