The articles in this volume deal with the main inferential methods that can be applied to different kinds of experimental evidence. These contributions - accompanied with critical comments - by renowned scholars in the field of philosophy of science aim at removing the traditional opposition between inductivists and deductivists. They explore the different methods of explanation and justification in the sciences in different contexts and with different objectives.

hiS volume in the Synthese Library Series is the result of a conference T held at the University of Roskilde, Denmark, October 31st-November 1st, 1997. The aim was to provide a forum within which philosophers, math­ ematicians, logicians and historians of mathematics could exchange ideas pertaining to the historical and philosophical development of proof theory. Hence the conference was called Proof Theory: History and Philosophical Significance. To quote from the conference abstract: Proof theory was developed as part of Hilberts Programme. According to Hilberts Programme one could provide mathematics with a firm and se­ cure foundation by formalizing all of mathematics and subsequently prove consistency of these formal systems by finitistic means. Hence proof theory was developed as a formal tool through which this goal should be fulfilled. It is well known that Hilbert's Programme in its original form was unfeasible mainly due to Gtldel's incompleteness theorems. Additionally it proved impossible to formalize all of mathematics and impossible to even prove the consistency of relatively simple formalized fragments of mathematics by finitistic methods. In spite of these problems, Gentzen showed that by extending Hilbert's proof theory it would be possible to prove the consistency of interesting formal systems, perhaps not by finitis­ tic methods but still by methods of minimal strength. This generalization of Hilbert's original programme has fueled modern proof theory which is a rich part of mathematical logic with many significant implications for the philosophy of mathematics.

This volume is presented as a companion study to my translation of Galileo's MS 27, Galileo's Logical Treatises, which contains Galileo's appropriated questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics - a work only recently transcribed from the Latin autograph. Its purpose is to acquaint an English-reading audience with the teaching in those treatises. This is basically a sixteenth-century logic of discovery and of proof about which little is known in the present day, yet one that arguably guided the most significant research program of the seventeenth century. Despite its historical and systematic importance, the teaching is difficult to explain to the modern reader. Part of the problem stems from the fragmentary nature of the manuscript in which it is preserved, part from the contents of the teaching itself, which requires a considerable propadeutic for its comprehension. A word of explanation is thus required to set out the structure of the volume and to detail the editorial decisions that underlie its organization. Two major manuscript studies have advanced the cause of scholarship on Galileo within the past two decades. The first relates to Galileo's experimental activity at Padua prior to his discoveries with the telescope that led to the publication of his Sidereus nuncius in 1610. Much of this activity has been uncovered by Stillman Drake in analyses of manuscript fragments associated with the composition of Galileo's Two New Sciences, fragments now bound in a codex identified as MS 72 in the collection of Galileiana at the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence.

This volume contains seventeen papers that were presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics/La Société Canadienne d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Mathématiques, held in Washington, D.C. In addition to showcasing rigorously reviewed modern scholarship on an interesting variety of general topics in the history and philosophy of mathematics, this meeting also honored the memories of Jacqueline (Jackie) Stedall and Ivor Grattan-Guinness; celebrated the Centennial of the Mathematical Association of America; and considered the importance of mathematical communities in a special session. These themes and many others are explored in these collected papers, which cover subjects such as

In this essay collection, leading physicists, philosophers, and historians attempt to fill the empty theoretical ground in the foundations of information and address the related question of the limits to our knowledge of the world.

The unusual ambition of this volume is to engage scientists, historians, and philosophers in a common quest to delineate the structure of the creative thinking responsible for major advances in physical theory. The topic does not fit anyone discipline's proprietary interests, and can only be pursued cooperatively. This volume was conceived in the hope that the importance of learning something general about how theories are developed and what makes the difference between productive and abortive directions of theo­ retical inquiry could overcome well-known barriers to such cooperation. The volume originated in a conference held at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro in 1988, as an installment of the annual Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy. Most of the papers descend from papers pre­ sented on that occasion. The authors are well known in their own disciplines, but should be identified to the wider audience for interdisciplinary work in science studies. Rafael Sorkin, of Syracuse University, and Don Page, of the University of Alberta, are theoretical physicists who have done research in quantum gravity and cosmology. John Stachel, a physicist at Boston University, is widely known as the Director of the Einstein Project and editor of Einstein's papers. William Harper, a historian of science and philosopher at the University of Western Ontario, is a Newton scholar and specialist in decision theory.

This book is the first to offer a systematic account of the role of language in the development and interpretation of physics. An historical-conceptual analysis of the co-evolution of mathematical and physical concepts leads to the classical/quatum interface. Bohrian orthodoxy stresses the indispensability of classical concepts and the functional role of mathematics. This book analyses ways of extending, and then going beyond this orthodoxy orthodoxy. Finally, the book analyzes how a revised interpretation of physics impacts on basic philosophical issues: conceptual revolutions, realism, and reductionism.

It is a trite and often lamented fact that every academic discipline suffers from the malady of overspecialization and expertise. Who, in his scholarly experience, has not encountered technical gibberish and the jargon of the pundit? The contributors to this work have aUempted to remove the artifi­ cial barriers between these respective disciplines. The purpose of this volume is to explore the ever present links between logic, physical reality, and history. Indeed there are not two or three or four cuItures: there is only one culture; our generation has lost its awareness of this. Though serious, it is not tragic. All we need is to free ourselves from the fetters of mere "technicalese" and search for a comprehensive interpretation of logical and physical theories. His'torians, logicians, physicists - all are banded in one common enterprise, namely in their desire to weave an enlightened fabric of human knowledge. It is a current, and perhaps weJcome, trend in philosophie inquiry to de-psychologize systems, methods, and theories. However, there is an equally fashionable tendency to minimize or even eschew the historical aspects of logical and physical theories, and analogously, there is a deep­ seated mistrust among physicists and cosmologists against the seemingly pure abstractions of logical formalisms.

This volume addresses the question of time from the perspective of the time of nature. Its aim is to provide some insights about the nature of time on the basis of the different uses of the concept of time in natural sciences. Presenting a dialogue between philosophy and science, it features a collection of papers that investigate the representation, modeling and understanding of time as they appear in physics, biology, geology and paleontology. It asks questions such as: whether or not the notions of time in the various sciences are reducible to the same physical time, what status should be given to timescale differences, or what are the specific epistemic issues raised by past facts in natural sciences.

This book on the structure and role of time in physical theories addresses itself to scientists and philosophers intereste:'i in the 'no man's lard' between science and philosophy, in particular between physics and philoso­ phy. The p:lint of departure is physical time, Le. time as usErl 1:¥ physicists in their theories; but the analysis is not oonfined to a purely physical level but caries the problem into the domain of philosophical in­ quiry. Altoough the book presupp:lses some knowledge of physics, I have avoided, wherever p:lssible, the use of advanced mathematics and technical details. Of all the people woo have been of help in writing this book, I w:>uld first of all like to mention Paul Scheurer and Guy Debrock who were my primary mentors in science and philosophy. This sttrly is a revision of my dissertation [Kroes 1982a] which I wrote under the stimulating guidance of Scheurer; many of the ideas ex­ posed here have their origin in his w:>rk and were developErl in frequent discussions with him. Guy Debrock not only stimulated my interest in philosophy but also made valuable suggestions. Witoout any overstatement, I dare say that without their assistence, this book w:>uld never have been written. Furthernore, I w:>uld like to thank D. Dieks, J.J.C.

Perplexities concerning Scientific Theories persist because the usual 'singled valued' philosophical analyses cannot do justice to the proble- matic features of so complex a semantical entity. The components of theories are like law statements, and like models and hypotheses, being conceptual entities which are used in a variety of ways - not all ofthese being always compatible with the others. Thus many physicists characterize the classical laws of motion, as if they functioned in a definitional way.! But sometimes these laws seem remarkably empirica1. 2 Others characterize such laws as 'conventional'; they shape entire disciplines much as the rules shape the game of chess. 3 Law statements are not exclusively any one of these - definitions, factual claims or conventions. They are all these things.

Philosophical Lectures on Probability contains the transcription of a series of lectures held by Bruno de Finetti (one of the fathers of subjective Bayesianism) and collected by the editor Alberto Mura at the Institute for Advanced Mathematics in Rome in 1979. The book offers a live in-context outlook on de Finetti’s later philosophy of probability. On several points de Finetti’s remarks revise widespread interpretations of his thought and reveal to be topical in the light of recent developments.

Are Western epistemology, metaphysics, methodology and the philosophy of science grounded only in men's distinctive understandings of themselves, others, and nature? Does this less than human understanding distort our models of reason and of scientific inquiry? In different ways, the papers in this collection explore the evidence for these increasingly reasonable and intriguing questions. They identify how it is distinctively masculine perspectives on masculine experience which have shaped the most fundamental and formal aspects of systematic thought in philosophy and the natural and social sciences - precisely the aspects of thought believed most gender-neutral. They show how these understandings ground Aristotle's biology and metaphysics; the very definition of the problems of philosophy in Plato, Descartes, Hobbes and Rousseau; the `adversary method' which is the paradigm of philosophic and scientific reasoning; principles of individuation in philosophical ontology and the philosophy of language; individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; Marxist political economy; and conceptions of `objective inquiry' in the social and natural sciences. These essays also begin to identify for us the distictive aspects of women's experience which can provide the resources needed for the creation of a truly human understanding.

This work will survey the entire range of thinking in psychology, from ancient times to the present, encompassing philosophies and theories of mind that pre-date our modern conception of psychology as a science, and extending to the current findings of neuroscience. It will set the theories into their historical context and cross-reference key influences, such as Darwin’s on Freud. Fifteen hundred entries will comprise key figures, theoretical concepts, false theories, historical events, and seminal writings. International in scope, this project will involve history of psychology experts from around the world and the coverage of topics will be set in global context. The aim will be to provide a reference work of more depth than discussions that are currently available in textbooks, with the ability to connect to a multitude of relevant topics. This work will provide a picture of psychology as it has emerged into the present time and position it among other related fields such as anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and medicine.